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IN THE SUPREME~ COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIE C. CLAUSSE, Administratrix 
of the Estate of LEON L. CLAUSSE, 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a 
corporation, FIRST SECURITY BANK 
OF UTAH, a corporation and AMERI-
CAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents .. 
STATEMENT 
To avoid unnecessary repetition, respondent First 
Security Bank, hereinafter referred to as bank, wishes 
to incorporate in its brief the statement of facts as 
set forth in the brief of respondent insurance company 
and the argument of said respondent wherever the same 
is applicable to this respondent. As we develop our 
argument, however, we will find it necessary to quote 
somewhat from the testimony. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. NO CONTRACT WAS EVER MADE BE·TWEEN 
DECEASED AND THE DEFENDANT BANK 
UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF CAN RE.COVER AS 
AGAINST SAID BANK. 
2. IF SUCH A CONTRACT WAS MADE, THE 
SAME IS VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDERA-
TION. 
3. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDE·NCE OF 
ANY AUTHORITY OF EITHER BLACKING-
TON, JEPPESE:N OR PORTER TO BIND DE-
FENDANT BANK TO ANY ENFORCEABLE 
CONTRACT WHICH WOULD BE BINDING 
UPON THE BANK. 
4. IF SUCH A CONTRACT WAS MADE, THE 
SAME IS ULTRA VIRES AND BEYOND THE 
POWERS O:Jr THE BANK. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. NO CONTRACT WAS EVER MADE 
BETWEEN DECEASED AND THE DEFENDANT 
BANK UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF CAN RECOVER 
AS AGAINST SAID BANK. 
It seems to be plaintiff's theory that in so1ne 
mysterious manner respondent bank agreed with de-
ceased to insure his life from the time of the execution 
of the loan until a policy of insurance was issued by 
defendant insurance company, or to state it more broad-
ly, perhaps a continuing insurance agree1nent should 
deceased fail thereafter to obtain such a policy and 
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if the borrower died before an enforceable policy of 
insurance was issued, the bank would somehow and 
from some source out of its capital asset, pay or can-
cel the loan. Construing Mrs. Clausse's testimony in 
the most favorable terms, we fail to see wherein it can 
be even inferred that such an agreement was ever 
made. We quote briefly from her testimony which 
also encompassed all of the testimony with .. reference 
to the making of this alleged agreement:· 
"We applied for a loan of $2,500.00." (Tr. 16) 
":1Ir. Jeppesen felt that he would have to 
go out and appraise the property and see if 
it was worth the value of the $2,500.00 and he 
would go out possibly that afternoon. He and 
Carl Porter came out together on the same 
afternoon." (Tr. 19.) 
"They told him (deceased) that we would 
be able to get the $2,500.00 and Mr. Jeppesen 
stopped and explained to him that if he would 
come to the bank that he would have the papers 
drawn up and so after he had given the· note and 
mortgage on plac~, he explained to _him they had 
a plan, an insurance plan, on that mortgage and 
told him that if he wanted it that he could pay 
it at the bank along with the mo.rtgage and we 
asked him how much the payments on that would 
be and he said around $3.00." (Tr. 20). 
"He explained to us that they had an agree-
ment with the insurance company for an in-
surance plan in case anything·: should happen 
to him, he being the bread winner so to speak 
and that it would take care of the mortgage in 
case anything should happen to him. He said, 
Lee, I would like to see ·you take out ·this plan 
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so that your mortgage would be covered by it 
and Lee asked him what the plan was and he 
told him it was an insurance plan to insure the 
mortgage in case anyt~ing should happen to hin1 
and he asked him how much it would be· and he 
said, well, it would be between $2.50 and· $3.00 
a month~ He didn't write out the plan but they 
would send a representative to furnish the' pia~. 
My husband asked him how these payments 
would be made and he said it would be added 
to our mortgage installments and be paid to the 
bank along with the mortgage; so he said that 
they would take care of so it would be paid along 
with the mortgage beginning the first of the 
month in February. He (deceased) told him that 
he would like to take the insurance but he felt 
that it was not necessary to take the full $2,500.00 
and he thought that $2,000.00 would be plenty; 
and Mr. Jeppesen said, well, that was 0. K. and 
then Mr. Porter spoke up and said, Lee, I would 
like to see you take. out the insurance plan. 1\fr. 
Jeppesen took and handed him a pamphlet of 
the insurance plan." Plaintiff's Exhibit "A". 
(Tr. 22, 23). 
"Mr. Jeppesen told me he would prepare 
that (note and mortgage) and I could come into 
the bank and get the mortgage and note x x x x 
I went to the bank and got the note." (Tr. 24) 
"Jeppesen told me that Lee had authorized 
him to go ahead with the insurance, that he 
would send the representative out and it would 
be added to the installments to be paid at the 
bank and that he would send hin1 out; that he 
didn't write the insurance, the mortgage insur-
ance, but he would send a representative out to 
the house." (Tr. 25) 
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"Later we received a letter from the bank 
with respect to the mortgage plan. December 
27, 1948." Exhibit "B". (Tr. 26) 
Plaintiff then testified that later Mr. Blackington 
called at her home and, over the objection of respondent 
that it was hearsay as against the bank, she. was 
permitted (pro forma) to relate the conversation with· 
Blackington. (See Tr. 30). 
"He (Blackington) said he had come out 
as Mr. Jeppesen had asked him to come out and 
go over the mortgage plan with Lee and myself. 
He also represented the insurance or the plan 
that was With the First Security Bank." ( Tr. 30) 
"The first premium was to be paid. February 
1st, 1949." (Tr. 32). 
"Blackington said he would have the doctor 
come for examination of applicant. Dr. Kearns 
came to make the examination about January 
6th or 7th." (Tr. 32) 
Over the further objection of the bank, the court 
permitted plaintiff to answer the following: 
"Q. Was there anything said by Blackington 
in this conversation as to when the insurance on 
the home or the mortgage would take effect~" 
to which she answered : 
"A. It would take effect immediately all 
during the period of the mortgage." (Tr. 35, 36) 
On cross examination plaintiff testified that after 
she first talked to Jeppesen about obtaining the loan 
and after Jeppesen and Porter had appraised the 
property they told her that the home was of sufficient 
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value to justify making the loan and that they would 
make the loan and that they did make the loan. (See 
Tr. 33) That she understood when she signed the note 
and mortgage that they were to receive the $2,500.00; 
that the transaction respecting the making of the loan 
was completed on December 18, 1948. (See Tr. 44) She 
understood the plan. It was to take out a life insurance 
policy on Lee's life so that if he died while the policy 
was in force the proceeds from the insurance policy 
would be used to pay the mortgage indebtedness. She 
further understood that there had to be an insurance 
policy taken out and maintained before the plan could 
work. (See Tr. 46). 
After some further questioning the following ques-
tion was asked and answer made : 
"Q. So you knew that the bank wasn't going 
to pay it unless there was a policy issued by the 
insurance company so that the insurance conl-
pany would pay the policy, didn't you f' 
"A. Yes." (Tr. 48) 
"Q. Sure, there had to be a policy issued. 
You understood that~" 
"A. That is right." (Tr. 48, 49) 
There is nothing in the foregoing evidence, con-
strued most favorably in plaintiff's favor, which can 
by the remotest possibility be construed to mean that 
the bank agreed to pay off the note or cancel the indeht-
edness if the borrower died before a valid policy of 
insurance was written, nor can it be construed as an 
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agreement that the insured would be covered by insur-
ance from the date the mortgage was made. The con-
verse clearly appears. The bank merely suggested a 
method whereby, independently of the loan, a borrower 
could by taking insurance protect his family against loss 
by purchasing an insurance policy on his life and for 
his own convenience permit the borrower to pay the 
insurance monthly at the bank along with the monthly 
payments on the loan. Construed most favorably to 
the plaintiff, it can mean no more than a conditional 
offer or an agreement on condition that if and when 
the borrower obtained such a policy and paid the 
premiums thereon bound the insurance company by the 
terms of a policy, that the bank would act as a collecting 
agent for the parties in the matter of collecting the 
premium and remitting to the insurance company. 
POINT 2. IF SUCH A CONTRACT WAS MADE, 
THE SAME IS VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDER.A-
TION. It is our position that the alleged agreement 
relative to insurance (granting for argument's sake that 
there was such an agreement) was wholly independent 
of the making of the mortgage. The evidence quoted 
supra shows clearly that the mortgage was fully con-
summated by the bank on the strength of the security 
offered by the borrower; that the ·note and mortgage 
was executed and the money paid before Blackington 
called upon the borrowers relative to obtaining an 
application for insurance. The borrowers' loan was 
approved when the home was appraised on December 
18, 1948. The claimed agreement was alleged to have 
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been entered into after this date. If such is the case, 
then the borrowers gave no consideration whatsoever for 
the alleged promise on the part of the bank. 
Smith vs. Brown 
50 Utah, 27 
165 Pac. 468 
Van Tassell vs. Lewis 
----------------Utah _______________ _ 
222 P. 2nd. 350 
Harris vs. Morgensen 
196 P. 2nd. 317 
Watson vs. American Creosote Works 
84 P. 2nd. 431 
Louk vs. Patten 
73 P. 2nd 949 
Oilman vs. Huddleston 
64 P. 2nd 97 
Richardson vs. Jordan 
32 P. 2nd 826 
POINT 3. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVI-
DENCE OF ANY AUTHORITY OF EITHER BLACI{-
INGTON, JEPPESEN OR PORTER TO BIND 
DEFENDANT BANK TO ANY ENFORCEABLE 
CONTRACT WHICH WOULD BE BINDING UPON 
THE BANK. There is no competent evidence of any 
authority of Blackington, Jeppesen or Porter to bind 
defendant bank to a contract of the nature and scope 
contended for by plaintiff. The court admitted pro 
forma and over the objection of bank, conversations 
between Blackington and plaintiff out of the presence 
of any officer or official of the bank. 
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A. Blackington was merely a local agent 
of defendant insurance company and even as 
between himself and his employer he had very 
limited authority. (See respondent insurance 
company's brief, pages 15 to 22) By what 
process of reasoning can it be said he had any 
authority to bind the bank by his alleged state-
ment that the insurance would take effect 
immediately. (See Tr. 36). He clearly had no 
actual authority and we certainly fail to see how 
he could have any implied authority. He was 
sent out at the suggestion of the bank to solicit 
an insurance policy on the life of the deceased. 
That was the extent of his authority. 
B. We further contend that neither Jeppesen 
or Porter had the authority to bind defendant 
bank in the making of a contract of the nature 
and scope contended for. However, we prefer 
to discuss this matter under point 4. · 
POINT 4. IF SUCH A CONTRACT WAS MADE, 
THE SAME IS ULTRA VIRES AND BEYOND THE 
POWERS OF THE BANK. It is alleged in the 
I 
amended complaint and admitted in the answer that 
"def~ndant First Se.curity Bank of Utah is a corpo_ra-
tton organized under the laws of the United .Stat~s 
Government being a national bank." Defendant ther.e-
fore derives its powers from the provision of the 
national banking act found in Title 12, U.S.C.A. and 
particularly under Chapter 2, Section 24, Page 18" The 
following statements as to the powers and limitations 
of national banks are all annotated in the code and 
t:3Upported by the Fed~ral.and U.S. decisions. 
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A. The powers conferred upon national banks 
should not be interpreted to authorize injurious 
policy unless fair construction of language clearly 
requires it. 
B. The measure of powers of national banks 
is the statutory grant and powers not conferred 
by Congress or denied. 
C. The powers of a national bank are defined 
and limited by the acts of Congress authorizing 
the creation of such institutions. 
D. National banks cannot generally exercise 
any powers except those expressly granted or 
incidental to carrying. on business. 
E. National banks may exercise only such 
powers as are created or authorized by federal 
laws. 
If we understand appellant's position clearly, she 
is seeking to bind defendant bank by an alleged oral 
agreement made by one of its Vice Presidents and a 
local life insurance agent to the effect that the bank 
would insure the life of the borrower to the extent of 
Two Thousand Dollars during the period from the date 
of the making of a loan until a valid insurance policy 
was thereafter issued by an insurance company author-
ized to engage in the insurance business; or else that 
Jeppesen agreed that if the borrower died before a 
valid policy was so issued the bank would cancel the 
indebtedness without the payment of the obligation. 
The following is self evident: 
A. Under the powers conferred on a national 
bank there is not included therein the power or 
authority to engage in the insurance business in 
any form whatsoever. 
10 
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B. Before engaging in the insurance business 
a COrpOration n1ust comply with the requirements 
of the insurance code of the State of Utah nnd 
qualify and be under the supervision of the 
insurance commissioner. It is not contended that 
defendant bank was so qualified. We contend 
that if it can be successfully asserted that there 
was an absolute unconditional agreement made 
between Jeppesen, Porter and Blackington on 
the one hand, and the deceased and his wife on 
the other, that such an agreement was clearly 
beyond the power or authority of Jeppesen or 
any- other officer or employee of the bank. Such 
an agreement would be ultra vires and beyond 
the power and scope of any of its officers. While 
of course the amount involved is not large yet if 
Jeppesen and an insurance agent could make this 
agreement, then by the same token they could 
make an agreement involving a- loan of One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars or possibly a Million 
Dollars. Once the power is admitted, the limit 
would be unqualified. 
A mere statement of the problem illustrates 
why national banks are limited in the scope of 
their powers. For the safety of the depositors, 
creditors and stockholders and to insure relative 
safety of our financial structure, no such power 
to fritter away the corporate assets of a national 
bank can or should be allowed. 
11 
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We submit that the court was in error in admitting 
even pro forma the evidence offered by the plaintiff 
with respect to conversations between herself and 
husband and Blackington, Jeppesen and Porter but of 
course the error was corrected when the court granted 
our motion to dismiss the action. We contend the court 
was clearly right in .granting this motion and that the 
order of the court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
First Security Corporation and 
First Security Bank of Utah, 
National Association 
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